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Design of Real-Time Bidder Support
We build upon the real-time bid evaluation metrics developed by Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) that can present bidders with exact price information whenever a bidder wants to explore her alternatives, thereby providing a continuous environment. In this appendix, we provide technical details of the computational real-time bidder support capabilities.
Let I be the set of distinct items to be sold in a combinatorial auction, and let N = | I |. The terms auction set and auction size refer to I and N, respectively. Bidders can place bids on any item set, which refers to any non-empty subset of I. A bid b can be represented by the tuple b = (S, v, id) . Here S denotes the item set the bid was placed on (∅ ⊂ S ⊆ I), also called the span of the bid; v denotes the value of the bid (v > 0), for example, the monetary amount specified in the bid; and id denotes the bidder who submitted this particular bid. Given bid b, S(b), v(b) , and id(b) are used to refer to the span, value, and bidder of the bid, respectively. We also use the notion of auction states. In particular, auction state k (where k = 0, 1, 2, …) refers to the auction after the first k bids are submitted. The bid set is denoted as B k , that is, B k = {b 1 ,…,b k }. Auction state 0 refers to the auction before any bids are made, i.e., B 0 = ∅. Obviously, B k ⊆ B l , for any k and l such that k ≤ l.
Given an arbitrary set of bids B in a combinatorial auction, a bid set C (where
We assume that the winners of the auction are determined by maximizing the seller's revenue, that is, , which is a standard assumption in the combinatorial max ( ) 
e., at any auction state k any bid b ∈ B k can either be live or dead, but not both), (2) WIN k ⊆ LIVE k (i.e., every winning bid is obviously live), and (3) DEAD k ⊆ DEAD k+1 (i.e., once a bid becomes dead, it can never become live again). Now, assume that an auction participant is interested in bidding on a bundle, say X ⊆ I. It is important for a bidder to know how much she should bid on X at a given time (i.e., at any auction state k) in order to guarantee that her bid is either winning or at least stands a chance of winning in the future (i.e., it is not dead). For this purpose the following bid evaluation metrics are used (Adomavicius and Gupta 2005):
1. Bid winning level (WL): for item set X at auction state k, WL k (X) denotes the minimal value that auction participants have to bid on item set X in order for this bid to be winning. In other words, after k bids have already been submitted, any bid b k+1 on item set X that has value above WL k (X) will be winning (i.e., v(b k+1 ) > WL k (X) where X = S(b k+1 ) implies b k+1 ∈ WIN k+1 ).
2. Bid deadness level (DL): for item set X at auction state k, DL k (X) denotes the minimal value that auction participants have to bid on item set X in order for this bid to be live. Similar to above, after k bids have already been submitted, any bid b k+1 on item set X that has value above DL k (X) will be live (i.e., v(b k+1 ) > DL k (X) where X = S(b k+1 ) implies b k+1 ∈ LIVE k+1 ). 
